How Russia Lost it's Pride and why Putin wants it Back?

START HERE, NOT IN 2022

Most people begin the story of this war on February 24, 2022. That is too late. The roots go back more than thirty years.

To follow this war, you must first see what Russia lost in 1991. You must also see how that loss felt. This is Part 1 of a 20 part series. It tells the story from the Russian side. It also shows where critics push back.

We start with one simple idea. Countries have feelings, just like people. Pride, fear and shame drive their choices. If you ignore those feelings, you will not understand their moves.

THE NIGHT A SUPERPOWER ENDED

On December 8, 1991, three leaders met at a forest lodge in Belarus. They were Boris Yeltsin of Russia, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine and Stanislau Shushkevich of Belarus. They signed a paper that declared the Soviet Union finished.

On December 25, Mikhail Gorbachev quit on live TV. That night the red flag came down over the Kremlin. The next day, the Soviet parliament formally closed the state.

The scale was huge. The Soviet Union had 15 republics. It had about 290 million people. Russia kept about 148 million of them. It lost about a quarter of its land. It lost its buffer states in Eastern Europe. It lost ports, factories and its seat at the top table of the world.

About 25 million ethnic Russians woke up living outside Russia. They lived in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Baltic states and other places. Many Russians still see these people as part of their own family. That feeling matters a lot later in this story.

THE HARD 1990S

Then the money world broke. Prices were freed in January 1992. They rose by more than 2,000 percent that year. Savings built over a whole life turned to dust. Factories closed. Wages went unpaid for months. Some workers were paid in goods, not cash.

Most estimates say the Russian economy shrank by around 40 percent in that decade. The life span of Russian men fell below 60 years. Poverty, drink and despair took a heavy toll.

At the same time, the state sold its factories, mines and oil firms at very low prices. A small group of men grew very rich. People called them oligarchs. Most Russians saw them as thieves.

Politics was also in chaos. In October 1993, Yeltsin fought with parliament. He sent tanks to fire on the parliament building in Moscow. About 150 people died. Two brutal wars in Chechnya followed. In 1998, the state could not pay its debts, and the ruble crashed.

Many Russians link this pain to the West. Western advisers had pushed fast market reforms. Western firms and banks rushed in. Many Russians feel that this advice broke their country.

Western voices reply that Russia's own leaders did the harm. They point to corruption and the rigged sale of state assets. Both sides have a point.

But for the story of this war, feelings matter more than blame. Millions of Russians still remember the 1990s as a time of shame. Putin reminds them of it often.

UKRAINE AND CRIMEA IN THE 1990S

Crimea gave trouble from the start. In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev moved Crimea from Russia to Soviet Ukraine. At that time, it was a paper move inside one country. After 1991, it became a border between two states.

Most people in Crimea were ethnic Russians. The city of Sevastopol was home to the Black Sea Fleet. Russia and Ukraine argued over who owned the ships and the port. In 1997, they agreed to split the fleet. Russia would rent Sevastopol from Ukraine. In 2010, the lease was extended to 2042.

Some Russian voices kept saying that Sevastopol was a Russian city. Moscow's mayor at the time, Yuri Luzhkov, said it often. To many Russians, this was a natural view. To Ukrainians, it sounded like a threat.

THE HAND THAT WAS OFFERED

Russia did try to work with the West. In 1994, it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace. In 1997, it signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In 2000, Putin said in a TV interview that he did not rule out Russia joining NATO one day.

After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Putin was one of the first leaders to call President Bush. He backed the US war in Afghanistan.

Russians say they got little in return. They wanted to be treated as equals. Instead, they felt they were told what to do.

Critics see it differently. They say the West made real offers. But Russia wanted more than a seat at the table. It wanted a say over its neighbors' choices. No Western leader could give that.

TREATED LIKE A LOSER

This is Moscow's view. The West saw Russia as a beaten enemy, not a partner. It gave advice. It did not listen.

In 1999, NATO bombed Serbia, an old Russian friend, without a UN vote. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq. In 2008, Kosovo broke away from Serbia with Western backing. In 2011, Russia let a UN vote on Libya pass. It believed the aim was to protect civilians. Then NATO's air war helped topple Colonel Gaddafi. Moscow felt tricked.

Russia also watched the "color revolutions" with worry. Governments fell in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Moscow saw Western money and Western hands behind them. The West said these were people's movements.

Each event added to a story Russians tell each other. The story says: the West makes the rules, and breaks them when it likes. In 2007, Putin said this out loud at a security meeting in Munich. He told the West that one power setting the rules for all was not acceptable. Many in the room were shocked. Many in Moscow cheered.

PUTIN'S RISE

On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin quit. He named Putin, a former KGB officer, as acting president. Putin was 47. He won the vote in March 2000.

He was lucky with timing. Oil rose from about 20 dollars a barrel to over 140 by 2008. Money flowed back. The state paid wages again. Real incomes went up. Order returned. Putin also took back control of TV, of big firms and of regional leaders.

Critics say he crushed a free press and real rivals. Many Russians say he ended the chaos. Both are true. That is why so many Russians still back him.

In 2005, he called the fall of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the century. Those words tell you a lot about how he thinks. To him, 1991 was not a birthday of freedom. It was a wound.

CHECHNYA AND THE STRONG HAND

Putin's first big test was Chechnya. In September 1999, bombs hit apartment blocks in Moscow and other cities. About 300 people died. Russians blamed Chechen fighters. Putin promised a hard reply. He sent the army back into Chechnya.

The war was brutal. The city of Grozny was left in ruins. Rights groups reported heavy abuse by Russian forces. But at home, Putin won trust. His message was simple. Russia would no longer fall apart. This image of a strong hand is still central to his rule.

THE IDEA OF GREATNESS

Russia has long seen itself as a great power. In 988, Prince Vladimir of Kyiv was baptized in Crimea. Putin often points to this. He calls Crimea a sacred place for Russians. The tsars later grew Russia into a vast empire. Under Soviet rule, it became a rival to America.

The memory of World War II is the holiest of all. About 27 million Soviet people died. Every year on May 9, Russia holds a huge Victory Day parade. It is a day of pride and grief.

History also feeds a deep fear. Napoleon marched on Moscow in 1812. Germany invaded in 1914 and again in 1941. Each attack came from the west, across open plains. That is why many Russian planners want a wide buffer between Russia and Europe. They do not trust good will. They trust distance.

Putin also speaks of a "Russian world." It means a shared language, faith and past. Ukraine sits at the center of this idea. Kyiv was the first great city of the old Rus state. In July 2021, Putin wrote a long essay on the unity of Russians and Ukrainians. He said they are one people.

In his mind, Ukraine is not a far country. It is the cradle of Russia. Losing it feels like losing a part of the self.

WHAT CRITICS SAY

Critics agree the 1990s were painful. But they say pain gives no right to invade a neighbor.

Start with 1991 itself. On December 1, Ukrainians voted on independence. More than 90 percent said yes. Even Donetsk and Luhansk voted yes, with more than 80 percent. Crimea said yes too, with a smaller majority of 54 percent.

In 1994, Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum. It promised to respect Ukraine's borders. In return, Ukraine gave up about 1,900 nuclear warheads that it had inherited. In 1997, Russia signed a friendship treaty with Ukraine. It named the border as the border.

Critics also say Putin uses history as a tool. It helps him hold power at home. Other empires fell too. Britain and France lost theirs. They did not invade their old colonies to get them back.

Many nations near Russia see 1991 in a very different way. Poland, Estonia and Ukraine call it freedom. To them, Soviet rule was an occupation. The same date brings pride to one side and pain to the other. That is the heart of the split.

Ukrainians add one more point. They say they are their own nation. They have their own language, church and culture. They do not need Moscow to tell them who they are.

HOW THE PAST SHAPES TODAY'S CHOICES

History is not only a story in Russia. It is a tool of state. Schools, TV and speeches return to the same themes. Russia was strong under a firm leader. Russia was weak when leaders were soft. Russia was safe when it held a wide ring of land around it.

This view shapes real choices. It explains why Moscow speaks of "spheres of influence." It explains why Russian leaders say that Ukraine, Belarus and other old Soviet lands are not like other foreign states. Russians call these lands the "near abroad." Their leaders see it as a zone where no rival power should hold sway.

Polls by the Levada Center, a Russian polling group, have often found that most Russians regret the end of the Soviet Union. Many of them do not want communism back. They miss the size, the safety and the respect. That gap between what people miss and what leaders promise gives Putin room to play. When he speaks of greatness, many hear a promise to end their shame.

Critics warn about a trap. A leader who sells pride must keep winning to keep selling. Each step needs a bigger prize. That is why they fear that the appetite for "lost lands" can grow. Moscow denies this. It says it only wants what history gave it.

THE RUSSIAN VIEW IN FIVE LINES

Here is the Russian case in five short points. One: 1991 was a disaster, not a birthday. Two: the West used Russia's weakness in the 1990s. Three: Russia was never treated as an equal. Four: Ukraine is tied to Russia by history, faith and family. Five: a strong Russia must hold a buffer zone.

You do not have to agree with any of these points. But if you skip them, you cannot explain what Moscow does.

MY VIEW

This war is about land and security. But it is also about pride. Russia lost its place in the world in 1991. Putin wants it back. I believe this is the deepest root of the war.

That explains why the war has lasted so long, despite the cost. A war for money can end when the bill grows too high. A war for pride is much harder to end. Pride does not do math.

It also explains why talk of "security guarantees" alone has not ended the conflict. Moscow wants more than safety. It wants respect. It wants to be a pole in the world, not a side player.

You cannot understand the war by looking at 2022 alone. You must start here, with a proud country that felt broken and ignored. In Part 2, we look at the issue Moscow raises most often: NATO.

TIMELINE

Dec 8, 1991: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus declare the Soviet Union finished.
Dec 25, 1991: Gorbachev resigns. The red flag leaves the Kremlin.
Jan 1992: Prices are freed. Inflation soars.
Oct 1993: Tanks fire on the Russian parliament building.
Dec 1994: Budapest Memorandum signed. First Chechen war begins.
May 1997: NATO-Russia Founding Act signed.
Aug 1998: Russia fails to pay its debts. The ruble crashes.
Mar 1999: NATO bombs Serbia.
Dec 31, 1999: Yeltsin quits. Putin becomes acting president.
Sep 2001: Putin backs the US after the 9/11 attacks.
Mar 2003: The US invades Iraq.
Apr 2005: Putin calls the Soviet fall a "catastrophe."
Feb 2007: Putin's Munich speech.
Jul 2021: Putin's essay on the "unity" of Russians and Ukrainians.